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Surreply
Setting the Agenda for New
Governance Research
Orly Lobelt
In The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought,1 I argue that an
emerging paradigm-governance-has the potential to tie to-
gether recent developments in the political economy with ad-
vances in legal and democratic theory. The article describes the
organizing principles of a new policy model, consisting of in-
creased participation of nonstate actors, public/private collabo-
ration, diversity and competition, decentralization and subsidi-
arity, integration of policy domains, flexibility and
noncoerciveness ("soft law"), adaptability and learning, and fi-
nally, legal orchestration. I consider these features in the arti-
cle in three legal fields-employment, environment, and infor-
mation technology. I argue that these areas reveal how the
emerging governance model can enable us to transcend the
false duality of centralized regulation and deregulatory devolu-
tion. Bradley Karkkainen's article "New Governance" in Legal
Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Over-
zealous Lumping,2 written in response to The Renew Deal, pro-
vides an excellent opportunity to refine the arguments on law
and governance. As should be clear from our articles, Kark-
kainen has been a prominent member of the academic network
that I identify in The Renew Deal, and his writings on envi-
ronmental law and regulatory theory serve as exemplary con-
tributions to the growing literature on New Governance. I am
t Visiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School; L.L.B. 1998, Tel-Aviv Uni-
versity; L.L.M. 2000, Harvard Law School.
1. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise ofGovernance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004).
2. Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal Thought and in
the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 471 (2004).
NEW GOVERNANCE AGENDA
therefore deeply grateful to receive his thoughtful and helpful
commentary.
Karkkainen's response calls for more distinctions between
competing formulations of the emerging paradigm and for
elaboration on the continuing relationship between conven-
tional regulation and New Governance approaches. Space per-
mits me to address here only some of Karkkainen's observa-
tions, and I offer some distinctions of my own to suggest paths
for future research in "this vast, complex, rapidly growing, and
exciting literature."3
I. ACADEMIC MOVEMENT VS. SCHOOL OF THOUGHT vs.
UNIFIED LEGAL MODEL
Perhaps the best characterization of the governance para-
digm is as a vibrant, alternative ethos to two oppositional or-
thodoxies-regulation and deregulation. 4 An ethos describes a
given set of beliefs that guide consideration of social problems.
Each ethos implies core tools and processes. Initiatives operat-
ing within the boundaries of one approach can be characterized
by reference to a certain set of tendencies and default tech-
niques. The importance of New Governance scholarship is to
show that the best policy solutions frequently cannot be easily
categorized as either regulation or deregulation. Karkkainen
refers to New Governance as "a distinctive new brand of legal
and policy scholarship," a "family of governance innovations,"
and "a family of scholars."5 But he warns against overlooking
important conceptual differences that separate diverse schol-
arly ideas within this larger body of thought. Is the new model
a unified one?
In The Renew Deal, I describe New Governance scholarship
as forming a new school of legal thought. I further suggest that
this school of thought is an active one, corresponding to a con-
temporary movement in legal academia. This explains why cer-
tain law schools-in the United States, primarily Columbia
3. Id. at 497.
4. For example, Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick describe "the model
of rules" as evoking the "ethos of modern bureaucracy." PHILIPPE NONET &
PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE
LAW 64 (1978). Herman Schwartz, like many others, describes an "anti-
government" ethos that emphasizes privatization and deregulation. Herman
Schwartz, Do Economic and Social Rights Belong in a Constitution?, 10 AM. U.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1233, 1235 (1995).
5. Karkkainen, supra note 2, at 473, 480.
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Law School-have produced a particularly high concentration
of governance scholarship.6 I also argue that both the move-
ment and the school of thought correspond to policy reforms
happening on the ground, pointing to the emergence of a legal
model in practice.
While in formation, an active academic movement con-
structively presents the dynamic contest and internal dis-
agreement within the school of thought. Often these disagree-
ments correlate with the primary fields and projects that they
oppose, in this case the traditional regulatory model. Legal Re-
alism, for example, has been characterized by theorist William
Twining as being, at its conception, a "movement," rather than
a distinct "school of thought," consisting of "a loosely integrated
collection of interacting individuals, with a complex network of
personal relationships and an almost equally complex family of
related ideas, given some coherence, perhaps, by a shared dis-
satisfaction. . . with the existing intellectual milieu of law in
general."7 As the governance school evolves, it will become eas-
ier to describe its underlying principles more in terms of what
they stand for and less in terms of what they oppose. However,
by its very definition as dynamic, flexible, adaptive, and itera-
tive, governance as both a theory and a set of practical legal
approaches cannot be captured, even if schematically, by a uni-
6. Increasingly active nodes also exist in other institutions, such as the
University of Wisconsin, the Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge Uni-
versity, and the Australian National University. Exciting new multi-institutional collaboratives and research networks, such as the Project on Pub-
lic Problem-Solving (POPPS) that Professor Karkkainen describes in his arti-
cle, also contribute to the governance scholarship. See id. at 471 n.t.
7. See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT 26 (1973). Duncan Kennedy often draws the movement-versus-
school distinction when comparing (nostalgically) critical legal studies (CLS)
in the 1970s and today:
There isn't at Harvard Law School or nationally any CLS movement
left. The movement completely collapsed several years ago. The school
of thought, which is academic, is alive and well, but the school of
thought doesn't have any activist component, period.
It is sort of ironic because the idea was to create an activist intel-lectual community, not just another set of bibliographical headings.
Hope Yen, As HLS Mulls Its Mission, CLS Scholars Remain Quiet, HARV. L.
REC., Dec. 1, 1995, at 2 (quoting Duncan Kennedy). I would argue that, per-haps ironically, part of the indication of the success of a school of thought is
the death of the active movement, as a result of the mainstreaming of itsideas. I also believe that, at least in the case of CLS, Kennedy uses the story of
the collapse of the movement partly as a strategic narrative, alluding to the
marginalization of some of its proponents and implying a de-radicalization of
some of its ideas.
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fled set of prescriptions. Although I attempt to provide both a
theoretical framework for, and practical examples of, New Gov-
ernance approaches, I recognize that any such formulation can
and should be subject to continuous refinement and contextual
application. In fact, it would be self-defeating if there was a
fixed and ex ante agreement on all of its principles, rationales,
and applications.8 The very core of the governance idea is ap-
plying law in a way that is sensitive to the particular context
and nature of a social problem. It further demands continu-
ously improving the chosen practices and relationships between
the public and private policy partners.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A SYNTHESIS (BALANCING
"LUMPING AND SPLITTING" IS NOT A NEUTRAL
INTELLECTUAL MOVE)
Within legal thought, distressingly, there have not been
many alternatives, in the form of midlevel engaged theory, to
the dominant discourses of conventional regulation and recent
calls for deregulation. In his presidential address at the 1992
annual meeting of the Law and Society Association, Joel Han-
dler warned against the decline of metatheories by progressive
thinkers: "[T]he opposition is not playing that game. It has be-
lief systems, meta-narratives that allow theories of power, of
action. When we look around, everyone else is operating as if
there were Grand Narratives."9 Karkkainen's primary critique
is that in putting together a vast range of academic literature
and policy practices, important distinctions and differences are
often unattended.10 Karkkainen is correct in his call for recog-
nition of theoretical and practical debates within the evolving
paradigm of governance, and I generally agree with the distinc-
tions he draws. I would like to emphasize, however, that a cru-
cial move within New Governance scholarship is the willing-
8. It is useful to refer here to Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite's descrip-
tion of "responsive regulation," which I characterize in The Renew Deal as part
of the governance school. Lobel, supra note 1, at 345-47. Ayers and
Braithwaite describe responsive regulation as "an attitude" that gives rise to
"a wide variety of regulatory approaches" rather than "a clearly defined pro-
gram or a set of prescriptions concerning the best way to regulate." IAN AYRES
& JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 5 (1992).
9. Joel F. Handler, The Presidential Address, 1992: Postmodernism, Pro-
test, and the New Social Movements, 26 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 697, 726 (1992)
(emphasis omitted).
10. Karkkainen, supra note 2, at 480.
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ness to generalize and to theorize across fields about the trans-
formative potential of third-way public action.
While it may be true that "the two most basic intellectual
moves are 'lumping' and 'splitting"' and that any academic
work should aim to do "a good deal of both,"11 I disagree that
the balance between "lumping and splitting" should be equal,
or that it is politically neutral, across all contexts. In the con-
temporary political climate, The Renew Deal's major contribu-
tion is the concerted effort to intervene in what has become a
stalemated debate. The importance of New Governance schol-
arship is the growing consensus among progressive legal schol-
ars that the regulatory state is no longer, and perhaps neverhas been, fulfilling the promise of just and equitable democ-
racy. 12 Governance scholars recognize that the traditional
structures of liberal democracy are limited in both their effec-
tiveness and legitimacy.13 However, they refuse to abandon the
role of an active state in a democracy.14 Recognizing the short-
comings of the two dominant orthodoxies of regulation and de-
regulation, governance as an operative project powerfully pro-
motes an alternative vision that engages innovative public
management techniques across legal fields. In their willingness
to synthesize an emerging social vision, progressive reformers
can move beyond entrenched and failed government structures
while resisting flat attacks on the affirmative state.
The attempt to model new policy innovations across legalfields and to work through the ideas of renewal in a structured
way is key in understanding the significance of the governance
paradigm to the existing legal arena. Disparate areas of publicpolicy reveal commonalities while requiring distinct combina-
tions of policy approaches. I have argued that the governance
model consists of eight clusters of approaches.15 There could, of
course, be alternative formulations. Through modeling, we canbegin to test the assumptions of governance against the richer
11. Id. at 479.
12. See DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN
EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright
eds., 2003) [hereinafter DEEPENING DEMOCRACY]; Orly Lobel, Rethinking Tra-ditional Alignments: Privatization and Participatory Citizenship, inPROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, GLOBALIZATION AND MARKETS: RETHINKINGIDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY (Clare Dalton ed.) (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at
3-4, on file with author).
13. See DEEPENING DEMOCRACY, supra note 12.
14. See id.
15. See Lobel, supra note 1, at 371-404.
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contexts of comparative and context-specific studies. We can
also better show the contest between various commitments and
meanings that underlie the theoretical vision. These are indeed
important directions for future research and policy learning.
III. THE ROUTE OF IDEAS AND
PLURALITY OF RATIONALES
In addition to providing a synthesis of an emerging gov-
ernance vision, one of my motivations for writing The Renew
Deal was to critically comment on the ubiquity of announce-
ments of new approaches in various legal fields. I try to illumi-
nate some of the dynamics of "newness" in the politics of legal
academia and to historicize and problematize the ways in
which new paradigms are translated into actual contexts.
16 I
therefore look for patterns in the logic and rationales that mo-
tivate New Governance scholarship. I find that many sugges-
tions on policy innovation cite rationales that are at once inter-
nal to legal theory, externally triggered by the political
economy, and cyclically recurring for professional and intellec-
tual rejuvenation. I contend that it is not necessary to accept
any one theoretical account, empirical observation, or causal
explanation in order to accept the general argument on the ne-
cessity of adopting more governance-based approaches to public
policy. Moreover, the constant availability of parallel and often
incompatible logics for change serves the openness of the gov-
ernance theory in complex ways. The hope is that precisely the
understanding of the existence of competing, and often incom-
patible, rationales for a shift (not only across strands, as Kark-
kainen describes, but also within each account) will be liberat-
ing. Acknowledging the complex framework of such coexisting
modes of crisis and opportunity, regression and progress, and
stagnation and innovation advances the ways we debate, the
ways we categorize and distinguish ourselves, and the ways in
which we use the framework strategically. Moreover, we can
learn to recognize the ways in which seemingly incompatible
rationales all offer some truth in decoding contemporary reali-
ties.
Karkkainen helpfully describes how governance scholar-
ship includes many strands and warns against conflating all of
them with continental autopoiesis and reflexive law, developed
primarily by Niklas Luhmann and Gunther Teubner. He ar-
16. See id. at 350-57.
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gues that another leading strand, that of Deweyan "experimen-
talism," is "deeply skeptical of Teubner's systems theory-based
approach, which both implies and demands a hyper-rationalist
capacity to map and reengineer the internal dynamics of com-
plex social systems so as to achieve the self-regulating reflexiv-
ity that Teubner recommends." 17 Karkkainen is correct that the
theory of autopoiesis does not represent the full range of ra-
tionales and ideas within the governance literature. For one
thing, there are certainly (as with other transatlantic jurispru-
dential schools of thought) important distinctions in form and
substance between continental and American thinkers.18 How-
ever, an important goal of The Renew Deal is to show that there
are strikingly similar patterns of explanation between, for ex-
ample, the strands of reflexive law and democratic experimen-
talism. Both describe the need for third-way approaches be-
tween market and state as part of the crisis of the regulatory
state in complex modern economies, and both demand internal
progress in legal and democratic theory. Patterns of similarities
also exist in the operative proposals of both theories. The im-
portance of Luhmann's systems theory, later developed by
Teubner, is its shift in perspective from an image of state ver-
sus society to an analysis of law, politics, and economics all
within one comprehensive framework. Interestingly, in his
most recent writing on civil constitutions, Teubner explicitly
links his writing to the idea of democratic experimentalism and
the related ideas of a "directly deliberative polyarchy." 19 Simi-
17. Karkkainen, supra note 2, at 484.
18. It might be helpful to clarify here that by the term "Renew Deal," I
meant to signify both the "constitutional moment" of the shift-moving to a
new stage in the public/private relationship--and to capture a key feature ofNew Governance, or the constant call for renewal from within the model.
While I often focus on the divergence from the American New Deal paradigm,
I try to show in the article, as Karkkainen helpfully elaborates, that the prac-
tices and the theory are transatlantic and global. Indeed, governance in many
ways signifies the shift from the New Deal concept of law, society, and the
market as exceptionally American to a new understanding of twenty-first cen-
tury globalizations. On the notion of globalizations in the plural, see Orly Lo-bel, Family Geographies: Global Care Chains, Transnational Parenthood, andNew Legal Challenges in an Era of Labour Globalization, in 5 LAW AND
GEOGRAPHY: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 2002, at 383 (Jane Holder & Carolyn
Harrison eds., 2003); Lobel, supra note 12, at 5-6.
19. Gunther Teubner, Civil Constitutions in World Society: Alternatives
to State-centred Constitutional Theory 8 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, onfile with author). Teubner cites writings on democratic experimentalism and
describes the links between
ideas about private government in the US and about co-determination
[89:498
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larly, the concept of reflexive law notably informs directly and
indirectly those identified with the experimentalist literature.
20
For example, Michael Dorf, coauthor of A Constitution of De-
mocratic Experimentalism,21 has recently described political
scientist Jean Cohen's account of reflexive law, which builds on,
and partly modifies, Teubner's theory, as "quite similar to what
Charles Sabel and I have called 'democratic experimental-
ism."' 22 Dorf offers, however, perhaps similarly to Karkkainen,
"an amended account of reflexive law in which data drawn from
experience at the relatively local level are continually refined
and transmitted to the relatively central standard-setter, which
uses the data continually to update the standards all must
meet. This amended account is accordingly both top-down and
bottom-up .... ."23 These exchanges reflect some of the transat-
lantic diffusion of governance ideas. The common theme is the
shift to debates about policy through design and the pluraliza-
tion of forms of public action. The focus is on institutional ar-
chitecture and the relationships among private and public ac-
tors rather than on the substantive prescription of state
legislation, rules, and judicial decisions. Questions about the
balance between central coordination, monitoring, and bottom-
up reflexivity are at the core of the debates about New Govern-
and other forms of democratisation of social sub-systems in
Europe .... Today, it can link up directly with post-Rawlsian ap-
proaches to deliberative theory of democracy that seek to identify de-
mocratic potential in social institutions, and to draw normative and
institutional consequences.
Id. See also Oliver Gerstenberg & Charles F. Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Pol-
yarchy: An Institutional Ideal for Europe?, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE'S
INTEGRATED MARKET 289, 291 (Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse eds.,
2002) (describing a "new principle of differential, democratic problem-solving"
called "experimentalism or directly-deliberate polyarchy").
20. See Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the "Relative Autonomy" of Law, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 1987 (1998).
21. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Ex-
perimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 322 (1998).
22. Michael C. Dorf, The Domain of Reflexive Law, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
384, 386 (2003) (reviewing JEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW
LEGAL PARADIGM (2002)).
23. Id. at 384. Dorf further explains that "[f]or Cohen, as for systems theo-
rists like Luhmann and Teubner, reflexive law is a mechanism by which col-
lective decisions of society as a whole steer other actors and institutions. In my
version (democratic experimentalism), it is also a mechanism by which rela-
tively local actors and institutions influence collective decisions." Id. at 398;
see also Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 960 n.277 (2003) (describing Cohen's version of "reflexive
law" as "something like what I call experimentalism").
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ance, and there remains much on the agenda to be deliberated
and learned.
IV. FORMALIZING FLEXIBILITY:
"SOFT" DOES NOT EQUAL "VOLUNTARY'
Primarily international and European legal scholars have
used the term "soft law" to name the shift to governance as a
whole. European Union scholar Claire Kilpatrick emphasizes
that "[s]oft law is shorthand for 'different from law (in its clas-
sical conception)', not 'less than law."' 24 Questions about soft-
ness, regulatory flexibility, and regulatory/governance interac-
tions are no doubt some of the most interesting and complex
questions in the governance literature. Karkkainen accurately
warns against the equation of governance approaches with
merely voluntary guidance. It is true that the concepts of "soft
law" or regulatory flexibility risk being misunderstood as in-
formalization or deregulation. However, acknowledging the ex-
istence of flexibility in the legal process certainly does not im-
ply a project "wholly reliant upon voluntarism or unsanctioned,
aspirational norms."25 In fact, what is new in the governance
model is not the existence of soft aspects of law, but rather their
recognition. Governance cannot and should not replace conven-
tional, sanctioned approaches in all contexts. Moreover, gov-
ernance processes often are sustained by the background of ex-
isting regulatory rules. Even more fundamentally, the very
idea of "flexibility" depends on the relative perspective of those
affecting and affected by the policy. 26 It may therefore be help-
ful to emphasize this point by describing the shift to govern-
ance as the formalization of informal practices that have al-
ways shaped policy.
In a series of articles, Karkkainen has contributed to our
understanding of the complex, ongoing interactions between
"hard" and "soft" measures in the area of environmental law.27
24. Claire Kilpatrick, New EU Employment Governance and Constitu-
tionalism 5 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The risk of
misunderstanding flexibility as voluntarism is partly the reason why I prefer
the term "governance" to such alternatives as "soft law" or "post-regulation,"
which can imply something "less" than conventional legal approaches.
25. Karkkainen, supra note 2, at 487.
26. See Orly Lobel, The Slipperiness of Stability: Contracting for Flexible
and Triangular Employment Relationships in the New Economy, 10 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 109, 111 (2003).
27. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management
and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L.
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In my own field of employment and labor law, I similarly warn
against the mischaracterization of governance approaches as
merely relying on voluntary processes. 28
In new research on occupational safety systems, I argue
that we should expand governance-based approaches to worker
safety while at the same time augmenting targeted enforce-
ment. 29 The literature on regulating occupational risk has
largely focused on the costs and benefits of top-down standards
versus market-based approaches, including pricing, premium
incentives, and information disclosure. Other aspects of the le-
gal process, including the stages of implementation and en-
forcement and the ways in which government can diversify its
interaction with regulated parties, remain relatively undevel-
oped. Writing about worker safety, I ask three questions: When
are cooperative versus coercive styles of regulation most effec-
tive? What is the relationship between collaborative approaches
and punitive enforcement? How can multiple approaches coex-
ist and dynamically relate to each other so as to form a com-
prehensive policy system? 30 I argue that for the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to be effective, it
must rely on both cooperative compliance and coercive en-
forcement. 31 It is important to emphasize, however, that a dy-
namic and interdependent blend of governance and regulatory
approaches to occupational safety represents a departure from
the initial design of OSHA as a regulatory agency. And despite
the fact that OSHA has been experimenting with governance
approaches for some time now, it is also a departure from the
paradigmatic perception of the Agency. The shift to workplace
safety governance is the shift to a broader spectrum of public
REV. 943 (2003); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance:
Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2002); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the Age of Collaboration, 2002 WIS.
L. REV. 555; Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regula-
tion: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89
GEO. L.J. 257 (2001); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Moni-
toring and Managing Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 903 (2002).
28. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Paradox of "Extra-Legal" Activism: Critical
Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics 26-27 (2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
29. Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The






interventions, including both sanctioned and semivoluntary re-
forms.
Similarly, in my work on transnational labor markets, I
seek to differentiate some expressions of the Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) movement, which focus almost exclusively
on such voluntary mechanisms as corporate codes of conduct,
social labeling, and private certification by nongovernmental
actors. 32 These privatized responses to labor globalization fre-
quently lack effective implementation, monitoring, and ade-
quate incentives to comply. They further permit the decline of
public forums for defining labor standards and welfare princi-
ples. I contrast these with New Governance approaches to
transnational labor regimes, which emphasize the interaction
between formal (diversified) state laws and decentered proc-
esses.33 These include leveraging the roles of existing interna-
tional institutions and enhancing tripartite participation of
governments, industries, and social partners, including labor
movements and nongovernmental organizations. The emphasis
is on multiparty participation, acceptance of regulatory hetero-
geneity, and policy-linkage. 34 On the agenda for New Govern-
ance scholarship is to continue to distinguish governance ap-
proaches, which maintain the perspective of public
administration, from noncentered, privatized forms of civic ac-
tion.
V. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Although I concur with Karkkainen on many of the distinc-
tions he draws, I reemphasize the particular value in recogniz-
ing an emerging consensus. I hope that The Renew Deal, as
well as this Surreply, will highlight points of convergence
among diverse thinkers and "brands" among the governance
scholarly community. Much remains to be studied regarding
32. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 28, at 26-27.
33. Id. at 35-38.
34. See JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND WORKFARE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE: THE PARADOX OF INCLUSION (2004);
Lobel, supra note 1, at 385-87 (discussing the European Union's recent adop-
tion of the Open Method of Coordination as a large-scale example of a govern-
ance approach); David M. Trubek & James S. Mosher, New Governance, Em-
ployment Policy, and the European Social Model, in GOVERNING WORK AND
WELFARE IN A NEW ECONOMY: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS 33,
50-52 (Jonathan Zeitlin & David M. Trubek eds., 2003) (recognizing participa-
tion, integration of policy, and diversity as major objectives of governance, and
analyzing them in the context of the European Employment Strategy).
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the neglected aspects of the legal process and of policy design,
including: How do traditional stages of the legal process-
legislation, rulemaking, implementation, enforcement, and ad-
judication-that have been kept separate under different gov-
ernmental branches, departments, and procedures become
more dynamic and interdependent? What conditions are most
likely to trigger shifts to governance-based approaches? What
are contemporary success stories of governance-in-action? Legal
scholarship certainly displays no shortage of case studies on
the failure of public policy. Future lawyers in law school class-
rooms, as well as the legal community-at-large, can benefit
from learning not only about what does not work, but also
about what does work at the levels of policy implementation.
Critical thinkers have long explored how the pluralization
of legal and social concepts can expand our imaginative spec-
trum. Rather than remaining monolithic, "public action" and
"regulation" as concepts can benefit from the innovative work of
governance scholars.3 5 No particular process for collective ac-
tion can promise results that follow a priori logic. However,
given the current climate of disillusionment about the law's po-
tential to bring about social change, a shift in the default as-
sumptions about the range of public solutions is a positive de-
velopment. The departure from a certain set of conventional
antagonistic moves in the debates about public policy and the
new intellectual energy surrounding the New Governance
paradigm broadens the range of responses available to lawyers
and policymakers concerned with just and equitable social ar-
rangements.
35. One example of such a benefit is the new ways in which legal scholars
can debate the merits and the stakes of "privatization" in a more meaningful
way. In Rethinking Traditional Alignments, I observe that for progressive le-
gal thinkers, privatization has largely signified the retreat of government from
public provision. Lobel, supra note 12, at 2. I argue that an alternative and
more useful approach is one that recognizes that "[p]rivatization can be re-
structured as a public technique of governance to nurture greater citizen in-
volvement to facilitate creativity and experimentation and to mobilize civil so-
ciety." Id. at 4-5. The first step in such a "progressive intervention in the
discourse on privatization" is to "proliferaten, reflect[] upon, and internally
challenge [" the concept and execution of privatization. Id. at 5.
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